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VAGRANCY STATUTES - CONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF "PUBLIC ENEMY"
LAWS.-[:Michigan] A Michigan
statute provides that: "Any person
who engages in an illegal occupa-
tion or business . .. shall be deemed
a disorderly person. Proof of re-
cent reputation for engaging in an
illegal occupation or business shall
be prima facie evidence of being
engaged in an illegal occupation or
business": Mich. Pub. Acts of
1931, No. 328, §167. Defendants
were charged with engaging in an
unlawful occupation and business in
that they had combined and confed-
erated with others for the purpose
of violating the statutes against ex-
tortion, the statutes governing the
carrying of concealed weapons, the
robbery statutes, and the murder
statutes of Michigan. Police officers
testified that the defendants associ-
ated with men having the reputation
of being murderers, "stick-up" men,
bootleggers and robbers, and that
the defendants themselves had the
reputation of being bootleggers,
"stick-up" men, robbers and mur-
derers. After trial by jury defend-
ants were convicted and sentenced
to imprisonment for ninety days.
that being the maximum penalty.
Held: on appeal, reversed. The
provision of the statute is uncon-
stitutional as it deprived the accused
of the constitutionol presumption of
innocence until proved guilty: Peo-
NEWMAN F. BAKER, Faculty Adviser
ple v. Licavoli (Mich. 1933) 250 N.
W. 520. (Four to three decision.)
The principle is well established
that there is no vested right in a
rule of evidence, and apart from
constitutional objections the legis-
lature has the power to alter or
create rules of evidence: Board of
Commissioners v. Merchant (1886)
103 N. Y. 143, 8 N. E. 484; 2 Wig-
more, "Evidence" (2d. ed. 1923)
§1356. Such legislation may go so
far as to permit the establishment
of prima facie presumptions against
the accused, State v. -LaPointe
(1924) 81 N. H. 227, 123 Atl. 692,
but the legislature may not arbitrar-
ily create a presumption of guilt
against the accused: Manley v.
Georgia (1928) 279 U. S. 1, 49 S.
Ct. 215; Hammond v. State (1908)
78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N. E. 416; State
v. Karts (1882) 13 R. I. 531; Dick
v. Commonwealth (1914) 159 Ky.
761, 161 S. W. 496.
In the instant case the majority
of the court stated in its opinion:
"If proof of reputation for engag-
ing in an illegal occupation or busi-
ness is constituted prima facie evi-
dence of being engaged in an illegal
occupation or business, and, without
more, establishes guilt, then we are
all agreed that the statute is un-
constitutional because violative of
'due process of law.' We are di-
vided, however, upon whether the
statute so provides." The majority
[9541
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adopted the view that the Michigan
statute established a conclusive rule
of evidence, and as such was a
denial of "due process," while the
minority was of the opinion that
the proof of reputation established
should be corroborated by further
competent testimony.
The conflicting views indicated in
the opinions of the instant case are
but illustrative of the variance of
opinion in cases dealing with stat-
utes of a similar nature. The ob-
jection most often directed against
the validity of statutes raising those
presumptions of a prima facie char-
acter is the broad one, that they con-
stitute deprivations of due process.
See Brosman, "The Statutory Pre-
sumption" (1930) 5 Tulane L. Rev.
17, 178. No doubt this objection
would be valid if such a statute op-
erated to place the burden of proof
on the defendant, but the weight of
opinion, however, appears to be that,
considered as a rule of evidence the
effect of which is merely to transfer
to the party against whom the pre-
sumption operates at lea~t some bur-
den of producing evidence, the stat-
utory presumption in the usual case
should not be considered to be a
deprivation of due process. Never-
theless, the contrary conclusion has
been reached in a number of cases:
State v. Beswick (1883) 13 R. I.
211; Hammond v. State, supra;
Manley v. Georgia, supra. And at
least the tendency of the courts in
more recent times has been to place
a limitation on the power of the
legislature to declare that proof of
one fact or group of facts shall
constitute prina facie evidence of
the main or ultimate fact in issue,
by holding that such legislation is
valid only if there is a rational con-
nection between what is proved and
what is to be inferred: Mobile,
Jackson & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipsecd
(1910) 219 U. S. 35, 31 S. Ct. 136;
Griffin v. State (1914) 142 Ga. 636,
83 S. E. 520; People v. McBride
(1908) 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865;
Manley v. Georgia, supra. This doc-
trine is contrary to that so strongly
contended for by Professor Wig-
more, i. e., that "if the legislature
can abolish rules of disqualification
of witnesses and grant the rule of
discovery from an opponent, it can
shift the burden of producing evi-
dence. If the legislature can make
a rule of evidence at all; it cannot
be controlled by judicial standards
or rationality": 2 Wigmore, "Evi-
dence," op. cit. supra §1354. This
doctrine was generally accepted by
the courts until 1910. See Keeton,
"Statutory Presumptions - Their
Constitutionality and Legal Effect"
(1931) 10 Texas L. Rev. 34. The
decision in the Turnipseed case,
supra, in that year and the recent
case of Manley v. Georgia, supra,
have apparently and effectively
wrought a vital change in the latter
viewpoint.
The purposes for which the Michi-
gan statute was enacted, namely,
greater facilitation in the prosecu-
tion of habitual criminals, racketeers
and hoodlums, all of them so-called
"public enemies" who had been suc-
cessfully evading both prosecution
and conviction, and the making
more certain their conviction and
punishment, were also the moving
factors in the passage of the recent
amendments to the vagrancy statute
of Illinois, Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-
Hurd 1933) ch. 38, §578, and the
disorderly conduct statute of New
York. The New York amendment
provides that one is guilty of dis-
orderly conduct who "is engaged in
some illegal occupation or who bears
an evil reputation and with an un-
lawful purpose consorts with thieves
and criminals or frequents unlawful
resorts': Laws of N. Y. (1932) ch.
58. The Illinois statute, on the
other hand, states that "all per-
sons who, not being persons au-
thorized by law to carry con-
cealed upon or about their persons,
deadly weapons, are reputed to be
habitual violators of the criminal
laws of this state or of the United
States . . . and all persons who are
reputed to act as associates, com-
panions or bodyguards of such per-
sons reputed as aforesaid to be such
habitual violators of the criminal
laws of this state . . . shall be
deemed to be and are declared to
be vagabonds." The statutes of all
the other states dealing with vaga-
bonds and vagrants generally in-
clude such persons as common gam-
blers, drunkards, prostitutes, beg-
gars, burglars and idle or dissolute
persons. Some go so far as to in-
clude persons known to be pick-
pockets or thieves. The Rhode Is-
land vagrancy statute, R. I. Pub.
Laws (1932) ch. 1902, p. 169, in-
cludes idle persons who are of doubt-
ful reputation and have no visible
means of support, and the South
Dakota statute, S. Dak. Sess. Laws
(1931) p. 101, establishes a prima
facie presumption that a person is
a vagrant if proof is introduced that
he comes within any one of the
enumerated classes of vagrants.
The constitutionality of the vari-
ous vagrancy laws, as contrasted to
the more recent "reputation" stat-
utes, has long been well established:
8 R. C. L., p. 340. Thus, a recent
case involving an unamended va-
grancy statute of the state of Wash-
ington, Rem. Rev. Stat. §2688, par.
7, in which a woman was prosecuted
for being a "lewd and dissolute per-
son," was contended by the defend-
ant, on appeal, to be unconstitutional
on the ground of its pertaining to a
"state of being" instead of to any
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specific act. The evidence showed
the defendant to have been found
in the company of a known crim-
inal, and she confessed to having
cohabited with him although not
married at the time. The statute
was declared to be constitutional and
the conviction was affirmed: Wash-
ington v. Harlowe (Wash. 1933) 24
P. (2d) 601.
Of the three "reputation" statutes
quoted, Michigan, Illinois, and New
York, and even including the Rhode
Island and South Dakota amend-
ments, only the Michigan statute, as
in the instant case, has so far been
attacked in the higher court. The
fate of that statute was correctly
predicted even before it was so at-
tacked: Comment (1932) 30 Mich.
L. Rev. 600. It is inevitable that
the constitutionality of the amended
Illinois statute will be questioned,
and the prosecution, on whom thc
duty of upholding its constitutional-
ity will fall, will be faced with the
fact that its terms are unequivocal
and the intent of the legislature as
'to its effect is unmistakable. The
prosecution will also be confronted
with the fact that, as the statute
reads, mere evidence of reputation
apparently creates a conclusive pre-
sumption of guilt. Effective as the
statute may be in the war against
public enemies, it is nevertheless too
sweeping and so apparently arbi-
trary that, when eventually brought
before the higher court, doubts as
to its validity will in all probability
be seriously entertained. Such a
fate would seem to be more certain
in the light of the instant decision,
for the Michigan statute, though it
endeavored to apply only a prima
facie presumption based on proof of
recent reputation, was still declared
to shift the burden of proof to the
defendants, whereas the Illinois stat-
ute includes not even a presumption
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but simply declares that persons of
bad reputation are deemed to be
vagrants.
ALBERT J. FEIGEN.
FAITH HEALERS - PRACTICING
WITHOUT A LICENsE.-[Iowa] The
State of Iowa sought to enjoin the
defendant from practicing medicine
under a statute describing those en-
gaged in such practice as persons
"who publicly profess to assume the
duties incident to the practice of
medicine": Iowa Code (1931) §2538.
The defendant was a so-called faith
healer who claimed divine power
and who believed that through faith
one could be healed. His method
of treatment consisted solely of
silent prayer, accompanied by a
slight manipulation of his hands
over the afflicted portion of the pa-
tient's body. Such believers as he
had, received the cure at the healer's
home, the latter maintaining no of-
fice nor publicly advertising himself
as a physician. Nevertheless, the
defendant was widely known to his
friends and neighbors as "Doc" and
at one time had had the initials
"Dr." preceding his name in the
telephone directory. 'As his fee the
defendant accepted voluntary con-
tributions from his patients. Held:
a healer who relies solely on faith
as his medium of cure, making no
physical examination or diagnosis,
nor publicly professing his ability to
heal is not required to secure a
medical license nor may he be prose-
cuted for failure to do so: State v.
Miller (Iowa, 1933) 249 N. W. 141.
The chicanery of the quack is, of
course, not the method of the li-
censed practitioner. At just what
point, however, such quackery does
become the practice of medicine
within the legislative purview has
been a subject of judicial disagree-
ment. While permitting some harm-
less healer to administer home reme-
dies may not endanger the welfare
of the community, to allow such
practice to receive judicial condona-
tion would result in wholesale
quackery being perpetrated on the
gullible, attendant with its mulcting
of fees and danger to human lives.
The various medical practice acts
devised by the legislature, describ-
ing those engaged in the "practice
of medicine," and requiring that
they secure licenses are the prophy-
lactics designed to preclude such a
state of affairs.
The majority of courts cognizant
of legislative intent have construed
the term "practice of medicine" in
its broadest sense, and have stated
that the disciples of any particular
school of healing were engaged in
such practice, regardless of whether
or not the prescription of drugs con-
stituted a part of their cure. Such
practitioners who eschew the use
of drugs must nevertheless secure
a license or be subject to the penalty
provided in the act: Parks v. State
(1902) 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E. 862.
The phrase engaged in the "practice
of medicine" is not restricted to its
popular meaning as being inclusive
of only those who furnish drugs, or
attempt a diagnosis, but is applica-
tion has been extended to include
those engaged in the art of faith
healing: Ohio v. Marble (1905) 72
Ohio St. 21, 73 N. E. 1063; State
v. Buslwell (1894) 40 Neb. 158,
58 N. W. 728. Under this broad
interpretation an application for a
charter to establish and maintain a
place for the support of the Chris-
tian Science Church was refused by
the court, when it was shown that
-one of the purposes of the organiza-
tion besides the preaching of the
gospel, was to heal the sick: In re
tFirst Church of Christ (1903) 205
Pa. 543, 55 Atl. 536. The court be-
lieved that when the healer knows
nothing of the science of anatomy,
physiology, or pathology, to allow
him to practice would be contrary
to the general law of Pennsylvania,
relative to the treatment of diseases.
And on this broad interpretation a
conviction of a Christian Scientist
for violation of the medical practice
act was upheld, the court holding
the practice of Christian Science.
was the practice of medicine: State
v. Bushwell, supra. Nor are the re-
ligious tenets of any church a shel
ter behind which one may conduct
the art of healing for pay, for if the
practitioner is guilty of practicing
medicine he is none the less guilty
although he also practices his reli-
gion: People v. Smith (1912) 51
Colo. 27, 117 Pac. 612. The police
power of the state is applicable to
limit the freedom of religious wor-
ship, when the practice of such reli-
gion is injurious to the public wel-
fare.
The minority view seems to be
that the term "practice of medicine"
does not include those engaged in
Christian Science healing, or faith
healers who exclude the use of all
drugs. Under this latter view Chris-
tian Scientists have not been re-
quired to secure a license, on the
ground that the provisions requiring
a license were not for the purpose
of compelling people suffering from
a disease to resort to a particular
remedy, but were designed to secure
for those desiring medical remedies,
competent physicians to administer
them: State v. Mylod (1898) 20
R. I. 16, 40 Atl. 536. Nor is the
fact that the court is convinced that
the healer may be a fraud or an
imposter sufficient reason to bar him
under this latter view, when the
healer has used no drugs: Bennet
v. Ware (1908) 4 Ga. App. 293, 61
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S. E. 546. The decision in this case
was rendered despite a very broad
statute defining the practice of medi-
cine as, "to suggest, recommend,
prescribe or direct, for the use of
any person, any drugs, medicines,
appliance, apparatus or agency
whether material or not," the court
holding "other agency" meant only
another medical agency as the term
was popularly understood.
The courts have usually held that
when the legislature in its discre-
tion has seen fit to recognize only
certain schools of medicines, and
established medical boards to super-
vise such schools, that such recogni-
tion was exclusive of any other
school of healing: Dent v. W. Va.
(1888) 129 U. S. 114, 9 S. Ct. 231.
So where the statute made no pro-
vision for Christian Scientists, they
were enjoined from practicing, de-
spite their contention that they be
given an examination on their abili-
ty to pray: Marble v. State supra.
But in a very strained decision,
Bennet v. Ware, supra, the court
-refused to uphold a prosecution
against a drugless healer, stating
that since the legislature had recog-
nized only three schools, viz., the
eclectic, regular, homeopathic, and
since respondent belonged to neither,
he was not practicing medicine, and
was not required to secure a license.
In a great many state followers
of Christian Science are exempted
from the necessity of securing a li-
cense by provisions which state that
the regulation of the practice of
medicine shall not be construed to
affect the religious tenets of any
church: People v. Cole (1916) 219
N. Y. 298, 113 N. E. 790. In Illi-
nois the statute provides that the
provisions of the medical act do not
apply to those who administer to the
sick by mental or spiritual means
without the use of any drugs or
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES 959
material remedy. However, where
skill is a necessary requisite in ad-
dition to mental and spiritual means,
as in the case of psychoanalysts,
the statutes of various states require
that such practitioners procure medi-
cal licenses: Crane v. Johnson
(1916) 242 U. S. 339, 37 S. Ct. 176.
While some courts have allowed
faith healers to practice unless ex-
pressly prohibited by statute, the
courts have been more uniformly
harsh in imposing penalties upon
those whom they considered as
quacks in cases where the patient
died as a result of treatment ad-
ministered by such persons. Thus
in the case of State v. Barrow
(1920) 170 Okla. Crim. 340, 188
Pac. 351, the court upheld a convic-
tion for manslaughter imposed up-
on the defendant, an ignorant doc-
tor, whose patient had died as a
result of a treatment consisting of
rubbing a brew concocted of refuse
over the patient's body, all the while
chanting weird incantations. This
penalty was imposed despite the fact
that the patient before applying for
this abnormal remedy was suffering
from a disease which physicians
estimate kills from ten to forty per
cent of its victims in any event.
The court was desirous of ridding
the community of this "faith-healer"
and established as its rule of law
that a person assuming to treat a
disease is bound to know the nature.
of the remedies he prescribes, and
the treatment he adopts, and he is
criminally liable for his negligence
resulting from the lack of such
knowledge. The general rule in
this country is that criminal liability
does not depend on whether or not
the person assuming to treat the dis-
ease is a duly licensed practitioner
or merely assumes to act as such:
People v. Hunt (1915) 26 Cal. App.
514, 147 Pac. 476; Hampton v. State
(1905) 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421. The
real question is whether there was
criminal negligence-a jury ques-
tion: State v. Barrow, supra. Such
negligence exists where the physi-
cian or person assuming to act as
such, exhibits gross lack of compe-
tency and this may arise from his
absolute ignorance of the science of
medicine and of the effect of the
remedies employed: State v. Hamp-
ton, supra. The result of such a
stringent rule is practically to insure.
criminal liability where one, ignor-
ant of the medical science, has un-
dertaken the duties of a physician
and caused the death of his patient
thereby. A few courts have held,
however, that the honest intent of
the practitioner will preclude crim-
inal responsibility, even though the
practitioner be ignorant of the sci-
ence of medicine and has assumed
to act as a physician: Rice v. State
(1844) 8 Mo. 561; Comm. v. Thomp-
son (1809) 6 Mass. 134. Iowa is in
accord with this more lenient view:
State v. Schulz (1881) 551 Ia. 628;
187 N. W. 469. Apparently there
is but one reported case involving a
prosecution against a Christian Sci.
entist where the patient died as a
result of treatment administered:
Regina v. Beer, 32 Can. L. J. 416.
The prosecution in such cases gen-
erally is directed against those in
charge of the patient for failure to
procure proper medical care: Peo-
ple v. Pierson (1903) 176 N. Y. 201,
68 N. E. 243.
Even in this enlightened day, mag-
netic healers, faith healers, and or-
dinary quacks are still able to ply
a profitable trade at the expense of
much human misery and suffering.
The issue is not solely between prac-
titioner and patient for the welfare
of the community may well be en-
dangered, and the members thereof
subjected to contagious diseases
when a patient fails to take proper
medical precautions. It seems that
the courts could best serve the in-
terests of the community by exclud-
ing all would-be healers from con-
tinuing their practice, rather than
by lending their efforts to the prose-
cution of such healers when the pa-
tient has already died.
DANIEL A. PANTER.
EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMONY.-
[Illinois] Defendant was convicted
of manslaughter. The deceased had
been struck by a "hit and run"
driver, and defendant was charged
with the offense. The case of the
People rested heavily upon the testi-
mony of an expert witness who
sought to prove that it was defend-
ant's car that struck the deceased.
The witness testified that he clipped
from the shirt, worn by the de-
ceased, a small portion of cloth
which had on it some paint flakes.
Upon dissolution 'in alcohol, the
paint formed a color similar to dis-
solved paint from the fender of de-
fendant's car. lie testified further
that close to a dent on the- said
fender, there was a series of line
scratches, which had been covered
with shellac for preservation pur-
poses, and that these numbered
thirty-one parallel lines per inch,
Examination under a microscope
revealed that there were thirty-one
raised threads per inch in the cloth
of the decedent's shirt, and the wit-
ness testified that in his opinion the
fender scratches were caused by
violent contact between the de-
ceased's body and the defendant's
car. Certain deeper scratches upon
the fender were found in close prox-
imity to the parallel lines and the
deceased's suspender buttons had a
figured design upon them which
fitted the grooves of the deeper
fender scratches. The witness con-
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cluded that they also had been struck
violently against the fender's painted
surface. The evidence was uncon-
tradicted although the defendant
charged that the removal of the
piece of shirt and the suspender but-
ton from the decedent's clothing,
together with the shellacking of the
fender were substantial changes in
the condition of those exhibits.
Held: judgment affirmed. The re-
moval of the State's exhibits from
their original location and preserva-
tion measures taken by the sheriff
in order to aid the prosecution's
expert witness in experimentation
were not substantial change suffi-
cient to bar the use of the exhibits:
People v. Wallage (1933) 353 Ill.
95, 186 N. E. 540.
No question was raised as to the
admissibility of testimony from
an expert witness, since the testi-
mony of experienced and well
trained experts has been affirmed
many times in various fields of
criminal science: People v. Fisher
(1930) 340 Ill. 216, 172 N. E. 743
(expert on ballistics) ; State v.
Mohrbacher (1928) 173 Minn. 567,
218 N. W. 112 (expert on hand writ-
ing) ; State v. Clark(1930)156 Wash.
543, 287 Pac. 18 (expert on photo-
micrography); State v. Kuhl (1918)
42 Nev. 185, 175 Pac. 190 (expert
on palmprints) ; Magnuson v. State
(1925) 187 Wis. 122, 203 N. W.
749 (experts on metallographic,
ink and documentary analysis, bal-
listics, sawdust and wood types, and
chemical analysis); People v. len-
uings (1911) 252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E.
1077 (finger-print expert): State v.
Crivelli (1916) 89 N. J. Law 259,
98 Atl. 250 (expert on chemical
analysis).
Although the court did not state
the qualifications of the witness, he
was referred to as "the expert chem-
ist Wiedeman" and again as "the
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expert witness Wiedeman," the court
probably having satisfied itself as to
his abilities without additional com-
ment. In numerous cases, however,
evidence has been refused or cases
reversed due to the testimony of un,
qualified pseudo-experts; People v.
Berkman (1923) 307 Ill. 492, 139
N. E. 91 (so-called ballistics ex-
pert) ; Jack v. Commonwealth
(1928) 222 Ky. 546, 1 S. W. (2d)
961 (ballistics testimony refused due
to the lack of expert's qualifica-
tions); Matthews v. People (1931)
89 Colo. 421, 3 P. (2d) 409, 23 J.
Crim. L. 115 (pseudo-experts' meth-
od of bullet identification held in-
competent). It is held universally
that the competency of witnesses to
testify as experts is a matter resting
solely within the sound discretion
of the court: People v. Fisher,
supra (ballistics testimony); State
v. Johnson (1932) 111 W. Va. 653,
164 S. E. 31 (finger-print testi-
mony); People v. Miller (1931 Cal.
App.) 299 Pac. 742 (medical testi-
mony); State v. Lowe (1931) 50
Idaho 96, 294 Pac. 339 (handwrit-
ing testimony); White v. State
(1930) 52 Nev. 235, 285 Pac. 503
(testimony of experienced crimin-
ologist) ; State v. Stuart (1933 Me.)
167 AtI. 550 (testimony on chemical
analysis).
The charge of substantial change
in the evidence made by the defend-
ant serves only to demonstrate new
methods developed in the field of
scientific crime detection. The por-
tion of the fender on defendant's
car, which contained the dent de-
clared to have been caused by vio-
lenf contact with the decedent's
body, was removed and shellacked
for purposes of preservation. Only
that part of the fender which con-
tained the dent was removed, in or-
der to facilitate handling, while the
application of transparent shellac
preserved, in their original state,
the scratches upon which the testi-
mony of the prosecution's expert
witness was based. In the recent
case of State v. Johnson (1933 N.
M.) 21 P. (2d) 813, expert testi-
mony was introduced to show de-
fendant's participation in a criminal
assault and murder. A finger-print
expert testified that certain prints
were left by defendant on a vase
which he used to club an unexpected
intruder. An expert, who was quali-
fied in the use of the microscope
and as a chemical analyst, conducted
miscroscopic examinations of the
debris taken from under the de-
fendant's finger nails. He found
therein a number of small bright
carmine red particles, which in a
series of tests reacted in the same
manner as the lipstick used by the
deceased. Since the deceased had
been gagged, it was concluded that
the defendant had acquired the par-
ticles under his finger nails due to
contact with the deceased's lips.
The testimony of the experts was
upheld and the conviction affirmed.
Courts have been ready of late to
accept with willingness the scientific
means afforded to aid in the seizure
and conviction of criminals: Inban,
"The Courts on Police Evidence"
(1933) Police "13-13," April, 1933;
Baker and Inbau, "The Scientific
Detection of Crime" (1933) 17
Minn. L. Rev. 602. But they are
continually forced to justify their
use of discretion in permitting ex-
perts to testify against the charge
of allowing the technical witness to
usurp the functions of the jury, by
giving his opinion as to facts ul-
timately to be found by the jury:
State v. Campbell (1931) 213 Iowa
677, 239 N. W. 715, 3 Am. J. Pol.
Science 21 (ballistics testimony) ;
Evans v. Commonwealth (1929) 230
Ky. 411, 19 S. W. (2d) 1091 (bal-
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listics testimony) ; State v. Bohner
(1933) 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W.
314, 24 J. Crim. L. 440 (admissi-
bility of lie-detector evidence).
This is rightfully so, since a great
deal of harm can be done to either
side by a pseudo-expert claiming
experience and training in some
particular field of scientific knowl-
(dge. Since, as shown, it is within
the discretion of the court to deter-
mine the competency of alleged ex-
perts, it is imperative that courts
be ever ready to protect both the
prosecution and defense against the
testimony of claimed experts. All
courts demand evidence of qualifica-
tions before a technical or expert
witness is allowed to offer the opin-
ions which he has worked out: 1
h1igniore, "Evidence" (2d ed., 1923)
§556. It is very possible that
so-called experts will have their
testimony proven faulty upon ex-
amination or cross-examination but
it is far better to prevent any op-
portunity of committing injury by
subjecting the claimant to a vigor-
ous and searching examination of
qualifications prior to the taking of
testimony: Smith, "Unmasking the
Pseudo-Expert" (1931) 1 Am. J.
Pol. Science 89; lViard, "Prepara-
tion and Presentation of Expert
Testimony" (1932) 2 Am. J. Pol.
Science 143.
Since courts have repeatedly dem-
onstrated their disposition to affirm
the use of new methods of crime
detection if presented by a technical
witness adequately qualified, the
problem of what constitutes ade-
quate qualification becomes acute.
If the determination of competency
is to remain in the hands of the
court without restrictions, different
degrees of ability will be acceptable
by various courts unless a similar
or identical group of qualifying
questions is employed by all the
courts. With all courts putting to
use a similar body of rigid ques-
tions as to competency, the true ex-
pert will attain his proper position





as] Davis was indicted in Texas
for murder and at the trial, after
impaneling and before rendition of
the verdict, the jurors were per-
initted by the bailiff who had them
in charge to converse with outsid-
ers by telephone. Evidence dis-
closed that these conversations were
with their wives concerning do-
mestic affairs. Defendant was found
guilty, and judgment was entered
on the verdict. On appeal, the
judgment was reversed, and a new
trial ordered, upon the ground a
Txas statute had been violated:
Code Crim. Proc. 1925, arts. 671,
673. The statute is merely a codi-
fication of the common law rule that
the jury shall not be permitted to
hold outside communication during
the course of a trial. Where statu-
tory provisions have been violated,
a presumption of injury exists,
which the State may rebut by a
proper showing that no harm was
done. Here there was no such
showing, therefore there was error
in refusing a new trial: Davis v.
Stale (Tex. Crim. App. 1933) 60
S W. (2d) 783.
The doctrine of the Davis case
is not at all new. The rule had
b'.cn in vogue in Texas long before
the statute was enacted: McWil-
liams v. State (1893) 32 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 269, 22 S. W. 970; Mitchell v.
State (1895) 36 Tex. Crim. Rep.
318, 33 S. W. 367. The solution to
the problem of the jurors' com-
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munication with the outside, as well
as other problems of misconduct at
trial, has taken, and must of neces-
sity take, two main forms. In the
first form, the burden is on the
State to rebut the presumption of
injury declared to have arisen when
evidence of misconduct is intro-
duced. This is the doctrine of the
Texas cases, and has also been an-
nounced in other jurisdictions: State
v. Burns (1932) 79 Utah 575, 11
P. (2d) 605; Crow v. State (1928)
39 Okla. Crim. Rep. 145, 263 Pac.
677; Aylward v. State (1927) 216
Ala. 218, 113 So. 22; State v. Ma-
heras (1926) 42 Idaho 544, 246 Pac.
304. In the other type of solution
the defendant must affirmatively
show that he was prejudiced by
communication between the jury and
other persons: State v, Williams
(1924) 132 Wash. 40, 231 Pac. 31;
State v. Hernandez (1931) 36 N.
M. 35, 7 P. (2d) 930; Wallace v.
State (1929) 180 Ark. 627, 22 S. W.
(2d) 395; Stengnach v. State (Ind.
App. 1929) 165 N. E. 919; People
v. Rogers (1922) 303 Ill. 578, 136
N. E. 470. The Texas rule is exact
in application where the State in-
troduces no evidence to rebut the
presumption. The judge has no
choice but to order a new trial. But
after the State has introduced some
rebuttal testimony a question arises
as to just what weight should be
accorded the presumption. It is pos-
sible to consider it (a) as a pro-
cedural device which casts only the
burden of proceeding on the State,
the risk of ultimate failure of per-
suasion remaining on the defendant,
or (b) as part of the evidence and
of some weight in the decision on
the merits.
In evaluating the comparative
desirability of these views, it must
be remembered that these rules are
designed to cover only the trial
judge's disposition of a motion for
a new trial. If the Texas view is a
procedural device, the difference ue-
tween that rule and that of other
jurisdictions is only one of form,
since under both the defendant must
show injury. If the Texas pre-
sumption is of evidentiary value, a
real difference between the two rules
is apparent. However, as a prac-
tical matter, it seems more reason-
able to believe that the Texas rule
should be used as a procedural de-
vice. It is doubtful if the niceties
of these distinctions are apparent to
some courts, and it is rather hard
to believe that a trial judge's reason-
ing processes are so adjusted as to
conform to the declarations of ap-
pellate courts in matters where
pristine emotional judgment must
inevitably play so large a part as in
these cases. Rules of law reach
their highest utility in appellate
courts, but their functional aspects
are never so pronounced as in trial
courts, where discretion is largely
lodged in the trial judge.
It is evident that irregularities in
the conduct of jury trials are cer-
tain to appear in the vast array of
cases with which courts are con-
fronted. In order to facilitate legal
business it long ago became neces-
sary for the United States Supreme
Court to adopt the view that new
devices may be used to adapt the
ancient institution of jury trial to
present needs and to make of it an
efficient instrument in the admin-
istration of justice. "The command
of the Seventh Amendment that the
'right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served' does not require that old
forms of practice and procedure be
retained": Ex parte Peterson (1920)
253 U. S. 300, 309, 40 S. Ct. 534.
The proper degree of stringency in
the enforcement of the purity of
trial by jury has been a troublesome
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question. The infinite variety of
the fact situations presented, to-
gether with the sacrosanct quality
with which jury trial is supposedly
invested, combine to put before the
courts a vexing problem. A more
flexible system is the desired end.
In the Davis case may be found a
groping toward practicality, which,
-%%hile admirable in conception never-
theless is not wholly successful. The
true evaluation of the merits of de-
fendant's motion for a new trial is
difficult to reach, and refinements
in technique have not made the task
appreciably easier. In fact there is
danger that they may obscure the
goal still more. In treating the
problem of misconduct in the jury,
there is no substitute for judgment.
What we must seek is wisdom in the
trial judge, not energy in the legis-
lature nor zeal for procedural rules




defendants, Lombard and Snyder,
were convicted of an attempt to kid-
nap for the purpose of extortion.
Dow, a feigned accomplice in the
transaction, had informed the police
of the defendants' intentions to kid-
nap someone in the city of Red-
lands. As a result of this informa-
tion, the police were present at the
time Lombard entered the premises
of the intended victim, and saw him
return, after an interval, to the car
in which he, his co-defendant Sny-
der and Dow, the supposed ac-
complice, had used in making the
trip from San Bernardino to Red-
lands. As the car neared San Ber-
nardino on the return trip, the police
recovered scraps of paper which
had been thrown from the defend-
ants' car. The scraps proved to be
an extortion note written by Lom-
bard. Some few minutes there-
aiter, the arrest was made. In the
car, which was owned by the in-
former Dow, were found a ball of
twine, two sheets, two pillow cases,
and the paper pad which had been
used in writing the extortion note.
Later Snyder took the officers to the
cabin in which they intended to
secrete their victim. At the trial
Dow's testimony revealed the de-
tails of the kidnapping plans. To
this testimony was added that of the
defendants' landlady who testified
that she frequently heard them dis-
cuss plans to kidnap someone.
Held: on appeal, affirmed. The evi-
dence was sufficient to warrant the
conviction: People v. Lonbard
(Cal. 1933) 21 P. (2d) 955.
The courts are in substantial
agreement that to constitute an at-
tempt to commit a crime there must
be an intent, followed by an overt
act, or acts, tending, but failing to
accomplish it. See 1 Bishop, "Crim-
inal Law" (9th ed. 1923) §728. It
is also settled that an act of attempt
to be punishable must go beyond
mere preparation for the commission
of a crime: State v. Dumas (1912)
118 Minn. 77, 83, 136 N. W. 310;
Ex parte tFloyd (1908) 7 Cal. App.
588, 95 Pac. 175; Bishop, op. cit.
supra, §729. But once a defend-
ant's acts have gone beyond the
preparatory stage, he is liable for a
criminal attempt, no matter whether
the reason for the failure to con-
summate the intended crime is due
to interruption which prevents his
completing the acts, or his voluntary
abandonment of his intended course
of conduct: Glover v. Common-
wealth (1889) 86 W. Va. 382, 10
S. E. 420; State v. Mehaffey (1903)
132 N. C. 1062; 44 S. E. 107; State
v. McCarthy (1924) 115 Kan. 583,
224 Pac. 44. The difficult question,
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as in the principal case, is whether
the overt acts, done pursuant to an
intent to commit a crime, are suffi-
cient to constitute an attempt which
comes within the cognizance of the
law. Field, C. J., in People v.
Murray (1859) 14 Cal. 159, the
leading case on this subject, said:
"The preparation consists in devis-
ing or arranging the means or meas-
ures necessary for the commission
of the offense; the attempt is the
direct movement toward the com-
mission after the preparation." The
difficulty in distinguishing between
an act of preparation and an act of
attempt has not been alleviated by
the application of Field's statement,
and any attempt to find an arbitrary
line of demarcation must fail, as in
the last analysis the difference is
one of degree: Commonwealth v.
Peoslee (1900) 177 Mass. 267, 272,
59 N. E. 55.
Despite the recognition by the
courts of the futility of analogy in
these cases, they continually refer
to the Murray case, supra, and other
cases involving entirely different
crimes. In the Murray case the de-
fendant was charged with an at-
tempt to contract an incestuous mar-
riage; he had eloped with his niece
and had sent for a magistrate to
perform the ceremony; it was held
that a punishable attempt had not
been committed. Inasmuch as the
only thing necessary to complete the
offense was the actual performance
of the ceremony, the Murray case
has become the bulwark of defend-
ants in contending that any series
of acts in a given case, of whatever
nature, have not gone beyond the
stage of mere preparation. Its ap-
plication in a New York case, Peo-
ple v. Rizo (1927) 246 N. Y. 334,
158 N. E. 888, resulted in the re-
versal of a verdict convicting the
defendants of attempted robbery.
The defendants had planned to rob
a payroll messenger. Armed with
guns they rode about searching for
their intended victim. They were
arrested by the police as they ran
into a building to commit the rob-
bery, although it later developed
that the messenger was not in the
building and the defendants had
never seen him. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the defendants' con-
duct constituted mere preparation.
The liberality of the New York
Court may be contrasted with the
decision of the Kansas Supreme
Court in the case of State v. Mc-
Carthy, supra. In that case the de-
fendants had colluded with a rail-
road inspector to stop cars in order
to give the defendants an opportun-
ity to steal their contents. They
drove to the agreed place with tools
and munitions, but they became
suspicious of the inspector and
abandoned their plan. They were
arrested as they were about to leave,
and charged with attempted bur-
glary. The car did not reach the
designated spot until the next day.
The court held that the defendants'
acts transcended mere preparation
and constituted an attempt to bur-
glarize. While many more cases
might be cited, the New York and
Kansas cases are illustrative of the
wide latitude allowed by the courts
in some "attempts" as compared
with their conservatism in others.
In the closing paragraph of the
Murray case, Chief Justice Field
makes the statement that an attempt
"must be manifested by acts which
would end in the commission of the
particular act, but for the interven-
tion of circumstances independent
of the will of the party." The ap-
plication of such a rule in the prin-
cipal case would not sustain the con-
viction, inasmuch as the police did
not intervene until the defendants
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were some miles from the scene of
the intended kidnapping. But Jus-
tice Field's statement is not sup-
ported by the authorities. See
Glover v. Commonwealth, supra, and
cases immediately following. In
the case of People v. Stiles (1888)
75 Cal. 570, 17 Pac. 693, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court made a ma-
terial modification of the strict rule
of the Murray case. There the de-
fendant was charged with the crime
of attempting to place an obstruc-
tion upon a street railway track.
The evidence tended to show that he
had a dynamite bomb in his posses-
sion, which he intended to place on
the track, and was on his way to
meet a confederate, when he dis-
covered that he was being watched
by police officers. He immediately
abandoned all thoughts of carrying
out his intended crime, deposited
the bomb in a flower garden, and
ran away. The court held the evi-
dence was sufficient to warrant his
conviction. In the principal case,
it does not even appear that the
defendants were aware that they
were being watched by the officers.
Seemingly, the California Appel-
late Court by its decision in the
principal case, has been motivated
by the factor to which several writ-
ers on this subject have adverted,
namely, that the facts in each case
should be considered in the light of
the seriousness of the crime at-
tempted, and the desirability of ex-
tending the rule prohibiting that
particular crime, or as Mr. Chief
Justice Holmes said in the Pea-lee
case, supra: "The degree of prox-
imity held sufficient may vary with
the circumstances, including among
other things, the apprehension which
the particular crime is calculated to
excite." See also Holmes, "The
Common Law" (1881) pp. 68-69, and
his opinion in Commonwealth v.
Kennedy (1897) 170 Mass. 18, 20,
48 N. E. 770; Sayre, "Criminal At-
tempts" (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev.
821, 845; Arnold, "Criminal At-
tempts" (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 53, 73.
To this extent, the fact that the
crime intended was that of kidnap-
ping, and the recent nation-wide
wave of that offense, apparently
played an important part in reach-
ing a decision in a field where the
question is one of degree.
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